DOHA, Qatar – In a heated exchange that has stirred anger across Europe, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Matthew Whitaker attacked several of America’s wealthiest European allies, calling them “rich, lazy & useless” when it comes to their own defence.

His comments, delivered on a high-profile panel at the Doha Forum in Qatar on 6 December 2025, highlight the Trump administration’s hard line on pushing NATO members to pay more for Europe’s security.

Whitaker’s remarks came during a discussion on President Donald Trump’s new U.S. National Security Strategy. He accused affluent European nations of spending too little on defence for decades, arguing that these “rich allies” have consistently fallen short and must now increase their contributions in a big way.

He set out a new target for NATO members: 5% of GDP for defence-related spending. In his breakdown, 3.5% should go to core military forces, and 1.5% should fund supporting infrastructure, innovation, and responses to hybrid threats.

This push builds on the Hague Summit deal from June 2025, where allies agreed to work towards the 5% goal by 2035. That is a major jump from the old 2% guideline that dates back to 2014.

Whitaker warned that the United States “cannot be the world’s policeman” forever and said Washington is shifting focus to domestic priorities and the Indo-Pacific. In his words, “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.”

The message from the Trump team is that wealthy, advanced partners must carry far more responsibility for their own regions.

European officials on the Doha panel reacted with open concern. Some raised the fear that Europe could turn into “just a museum” that depends on U.S. protection. Whitaker hit back with a sharp question: Is Europe a living, growing economy that can defend itself, or is it a comfortable playground, enjoying “lovely wines and cheeses” while leaving security bills to American taxpayers?

Long-Standing Tensions Over Defence Budgets

Whitaker’s anger reflects a long history of U.S. frustration over NATO spending. Many European member states have failed to meet even the modest 2% target that allies set after Russia seized Crimea in 2014. Back then, NATO countries promised to move towards 2% by 2024.

Progress stayed slow until Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced governments to react. By 2024, 23 of 32 NATO members will have finally hit the 2% level, helped along by pressure from Trump’s first term and the urgent need to support Ukraine.

For Whitaker and the Trump administration, this is still not enough for the current threat environment. Russia is believed to spend around 7 to 8% of its GDP on rebuilding its military. On top of that, NATO faces cyber attacks, hybrid warfare, and power moves from China. The United States itself spends about 3.4% of GDP on defence, but also covers most of NATO’s operational costs, including large troop deployments in Europe and the alliance’s nuclear shield.

Whitaker has repeated that there will be “no exemptions.” Countries with a long record of low spending, such as Spain, which has hovered around 1.3%, face extra pressure. President Trump has floated ideas such as trade sanctions or even threats of expulsion for chronic underspenders. Whitaker uses more diplomatic language, but his message is still tough and direct.

Article 5: “Ironclad” Support, With Strings Attached

With Europe anxious about U.S. talks with Russia over Ukraine, many fear a weaker American commitment to NATO. Whitaker tried to calm those nerves, stating that Article 5, the mutual defence clause, remains “ironclad.” At the same time, he placed a clear condition on that promise, tying it to Article 3, which requires each member to build and maintain its own strength for collective defence.

“Leadership is not charity,” he has said in public appearances. The meaning is clear. Full U.S. protection comes with expectations. Allies are meant to invest in their own security, not simply rely on Washington. This matches Trump’s earlier campaign comments, when he said Russia could “do whatever the hell it wants” to NATO members that refuse to spend enough. Those words caused outrage across Europe, yet they also helped drive a sharp rise in defence budgets.

Renewing NATO’s military strength

European responses to Whitaker’s latest comments range from anger to cautious support. Countries near Russia’s borders, such as Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, have embraced the call for higher defence spending. Poland, already spending around 4.12% of GDP and planning to go further, has praised Trump’s tough stance and credits U.S. pressure with renewing NATO’s military strength.

Larger economies like Germany, France, and Italy are far more hesitant. Germany only reached the 2% goal in 2024 after years of internal debate and concern about costs for social welfare programmes.

French leaders talk about “European strategic autonomy,” pushing for stronger EU defence structures alongside NATO. Critics across Western Europe argue that a 5% target is unrealistic. They warn it could drain money from economic growth, healthcare, education, or climate projects at a time when the continent is still dealing with energy shocks from the Ukraine war.

NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has backed higher spending, stating that “in a more dangerous world, 2% will not be enough.” He says allies must adopt a “wartime mindset” to deal with threats from Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, which he portrays as part of a loose anti-Western axis.

Whitaker has also hinted that this 5% benchmark might not stay limited to NATO. He has suggested that America could push for the same standard with allies in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific, setting a global pattern for security partnerships.

At the core of Whitaker’s message lies Trump’s “America First” approach. The administration wants to focus on border security, rebuilding U.S. infrastructure, and competing with China. In that context, Washington is looking to reduce its military footprint in Europe.

Possible troop cuts are under review, involving some of the tens of thousands of American soldiers based on the continent. Whitaker says “nothing has been determined,” yet the direction of travel is clear.

If the United States pulls back, European allies would have to grow their own capabilities at scale. That would mean bigger armies, stronger air and missile defences, more ships, and larger stockpiles of ammunition and spare parts.

Supporters of this shift argue it would finally push Europe into adulthood on security, creating a more balanced alliance. Opponents fear it could weaken NATO’s unity, especially if U.S. talks with Moscow lead to a Ukraine settlement that many Europeans see as too soft on Russia.

What 5% Could Mean, and Why It Will Be Hard

If all NATO members hit the 5% target by 2035, the alliance’s total military strength would surge. Trillions in added spending could support powerful deterrence across Europe, especially on the eastern flank. Countries from the Baltic to the Black Sea would gain stronger defences. Western European industries might enjoy a boom in defence contracts, from advanced aircraft to cyber security systems.

However, serious obstacles stand in the way. Many European publics remain wary of high military spending, especially in states with strong pacifist traditions. High public debt and ageing populations add to the strain.

Governments will argue over what should count as “defence spending.” Some want to include rail links, ports, and energy grids, since they are key for moving troops and keeping societies running in a crisis. Others insist that only direct military spending should qualify.

There is also a transatlantic economic angle. Some European politicians call for favouring local defence firms over U.S. companies. Whitaker has warned that shutting American suppliers out of major contracts would harm NATO’s ability to work as a single force and would weaken shared standards and technology.

Whitaker’s remark that some allies are “rich, lazy & useless” may sound crude and undiplomatic, but it captures the Trump administration’s deep impatience. The comment has forced leaders and publics to talk more openly about who pays for security and what NATO should look like in the 2030s. Just as Trump’s threats in his first term shook the alliance into action, this latest clash could either spur serious reform or widen splits.

In Doha, Whitaker summed up his stance with a blunt warning. Wealthy allies must “step up” or risk drifting into irrelevance. As Trump shifts America’s focus closer to home and towards Asia, Europe faces a clear decision. It can invest heavily in defence and carry more of its own weight, or it can live with the risk that U.S. backing will be smaller, tougher, and more conditional than at any time in NATO’s 76-year history.

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In just over a year, France has gone through three prime ministers. A journalist recently asked me why French politics has become so unstable. The short answer is easy to give, but the full story is about how a system built to avoid chaos has slipped into it.

How Macron Set Off the Current Crisis

The current political mess began with President Emmanuel Macron’s choice in June last year to dissolve the National Assembly and call early elections. He made this move right after the European Parliament elections, hoping a snap election would strengthen his hand.

The bet failed. Instead of gaining ground, he lost his already fragile majority in parliament.

A Presidential System, But Only Under Certain Conditions

France is often seen as a textbook example of a presidential system. The Fifth Republic, created in 1958, was designed to give strong powers to the president and avoid the constant turmoil that marked the Fourth Republic.

This model works smoothly when the president and the parliamentary majority come from the same political camp. In that case, which is how the system was broadly imagined, the prime minister acts as the president’s chief operator, pushing through the presidential agenda.

Things change when the majority in the National Assembly belongs to a different camp. Power then shifts away from the Élysée Palace and towards parliament. The president still matters, especially on foreign policy and defence, but the prime minister becomes the key player on domestic issues.

The French call this cohabitation, and it has happened several times.

Cohabitation in the Past

Socialist President François Mitterrand had to govern with prime ministers from the right, first Jacques Chirac, then Édouard Balladur. When Chirac became president, he faced the same situation from the other side. After calling a snap election that also went wrong, he had to work for several years with Socialist Prime Minister Lionel Jospin.

Those periods were tense and often quarrelsome, but they did not break the system. There was always a stable majority in parliament, even if it was not on the president’s side.

Why This Crisis Is Different

The current crisis is different for a simple reason: there is no majority in parliament. The problem is not cohabitation this time; it is fragmentation.

After last year’s snap election, no political bloc controls enough seats to govern alone. Macron’s centrists do not have a majority, and neither do the traditional right, the far right, or the left. The left-wing alliance of Socialists, Greens, and the far left won the largest share of seats, but still fell short of an outright majority.

Since then, Macron has focused on blocking a left-wing government from taking power. He has planned to build a centrist and centre-right coalition, topped up with enough Socialist MPs to get over the line.

The numbers simply do not work.

• If you give the Socialists what they demand, such as higher taxes on the wealthy or rolling back the pension reform, the right refuses to back the government.
• If you give the Socialists what they want, they pull out and can team up with the rest of the left and even parts of the far right to bring the government down.

Sébastien Lecornu, and before him Michel Barnier and François Bayrou, have all come up against the same dead end.

All this is happening while France’s public deficit keeps growing. Many voters now feel that the political class is unable to govern properly and that the system no longer functions. That mood is feeding support for populist parties both on the right and on the left.

Possible Ways Forward

If I had Macron’s ear, I would suggest a government of national unity, something similar to Switzerland’s model, where all major parties share power. Instead of being held hostage by each group, the president could pass responsibility back to them and make them share the burden of governing.

Another option would be a technocratic government, along the lines of what Italy has used during severe political standstills. In that setup, non-partisan experts run key ministries, and parties support them from parliament.

Both ideas sit uneasily with French political habits. They would require a big step into territory that France has rarely tried. That makes them unlikely in practice. A fresh snap election, sooner rather than later, seems the most probable outcome.

Back to the Fourth Republic?

There is an almost ironic twist to all of this. Today’s situation looks strikingly similar to the old Fourth Republic, a period marked by splintered parties, constant bargaining, and fragile coalitions that fell one after another. The Fifth Republic was designed precisely to break with that pattern.

Yet France now appears to be sliding back into the same kind of parliamentary chaos that the founders of the Fifth Republic wanted to leave behind.

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The Dayton Peace Agreement, signed in 1995, marked a historic turning point at the end of the twentieth century. It kept Bosnia and Herzegovina intact as a state and stopped a war that had lasted three and a half years.

The major global powers agreed on an international deal that protected the country’s statehood, borders, and status in international law.

Acting through the Contact Group, members of the UN Security Council (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, the Russian Federation, and the Federal Republic of Germany) set up the basic framework for long-term peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Ending the war and the limits on building a functional state

Most authors agree that the Dayton Peace Agreement played a key role in ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the same time, critics, especially of Annex IV,[3] argue that the ethnic-based constitutional and territorial set-up has held back the development of an effective and functional state.

Unlike many other peace agreements, the Dayton arrangement gives clear powers to international bodies to oversee and support its implementation.

The main actors in this process are:

• Peacekeeping forces, led by NATO, under a UN Security Council decision of December 1995
• The Office of the High Representative (OHR), with the High Representative serving as the top civilian authority for implementing the non-military parts of the agreement and supporting peacebuilding
• The European Union Special Representative, who backs reforms linked to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s path towards EU membership
• The Peace Implementation Council (PIC)

In the first post-war decade (1995 to 2005), international institutions helped to improve security and restore freedom of movement for people across the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the early years after the war, the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina held its sessions in the National Museum because the Serb member of the Presidency at that time refused to use the official Presidency building in Sarajevo as the seat of state institutions.

Within the first five years, the High Representative, working with civil society organisations, designed and imposed a new coat of arms, flag, and anthem. The ruling parliamentary parties were unable to agree on these basic state symbols.

Parliamentary elections held in 1996, 1998, and 2000, with two-year mandates for state and entity parliaments, were meant to speed up democratic consolidation and support multi-ethnic civic parties. In practice, ethnic parties continued to dominate most election results.

Because ethnic parties could not agree on peacebuilding and state-building, the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) gave the High Representative the so-called Bonn Powers in 1998. Using these powers, the High Representative imposed 145 laws that formally belonged under the authority of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

These laws allowed reforms that supported peace consolidation and the creation of core state institutions. As part of these changes, the State Border Service (later the Border Police) and the Indirect Taxation Authority were created.

The Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina grew from three to nine ministries, adding portfolios such as security, justice, human rights and refugees, transport and communications, the treasury and finance, and defence. This expansion gave the state a stronger executive capacity to carry out reforms and to support Bosnia and Herzegovina’s European Union integration process.

Joint Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a key post-Dayton reform

The unification of the separate entity armies into a single Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina is seen as one of the most important reforms after Dayton. This step brought full integration of entity forces and defence institutions at the state level. The development of the Armed Forces in line with NATO standards opened the way for gradual integration into the NATO alliance, as outlined in the Law on Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Major reforms also took place in the justice and security fields. The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Prosecutor’s Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina were established, along with the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC). The Intelligence-Security Agency (OSA) and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) created the basic structure for a functioning state security system.

The full implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement is now closely linked to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s integration into the European Union and NATO. Progress has been slow, largely because of a lack of agreement among ruling parties in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since 2015, the High Representative has gradually reduced the use of the Bonn Powers.

Geopolitical changes near the end of the third decade of the Dayton period, especially the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2022, threatened peace in Europe but also sped up European integration processes. In this context, the Council of the European Union granted Bosnia and Herzegovina candidate status for EU membership, and negotiations are expected to start at the end of 2025.

Blockades of state institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the obstructive actions of the National Assembly of the Republika Srpska slowed legislative work and reform. However, in 2025, rulings by the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina helped break these blockades. The removal of Milorad Dodik (SNSD) from the post of President of the Republika Srpska marked a turning point in strengthening state institutions and pushing forward the country’s European integration path.

Political instability and the ongoing role of the OHR

As long as political life in Bosnia and Herzegovina remains unstable, with frequent crises of different intensity, the presence and engagement of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) will be necessary.

Its role is especially important in:

• Stopping actions that undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement
• Helping build the level of agreement needed to pass legislation in the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is essential for progress towards the European Union

Over the past thirty years, the OHR has used the Bonn Powers whenever ruling parties could not reach an agreement in the Parliamentary Assembly. This function is likely to remain important until Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes a full member of the European Union. The length of the OHR’s mandate in the coming years is closely linked to progress in EU and NATO integration and to the need to prevent new security risks and threats.

Recommendations for speeding up Bosnia and Herzegovina’s European integration

Key steps that could support faster EU integration include:

• Joint work by the OHR and the European Union Special Representative on putting the reform agenda into practice
• Turning the reform agenda into a joint document of the OHR and the EU Special Representative, prepared in cooperation with the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

A major priority for the OHR is to support the adoption of a European clause in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This would make it easier and quicker to bring domestic law into line with the EU acquis communautaire.

The OHR should also increase pressure on parliamentary parties to form a broad coalition in support of a European, democratic, and law-governed Bosnia and Herzegovina after the 2026 elections. Such a coalition would give the winning parties a clear mandate and responsibility to push forward the EU integration agenda.

The OHR also has an important role in helping create international and regional conditions for constitutional reforms that are needed to speed up EU integration. Strengthening the democratic capacity of state institutions is linked to changes in the structure of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Under these ideas, the House of Representatives would grow from 42 to 97 members, and electoral territorial units would cross entity borders rather than follow them. A larger number of representatives would allow for more thorough legislative work in committees and commissions.

It would also open space for professional associations and civil society organisations to engage more actively in public policy. At the same time, both the structure and the powers of the House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly would be revised.

For the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina, proposals include the creation of two new ministries: a Ministry of Science and Technological Development and a Ministry of Agriculture and Ecology.

These ministries would respond to long-term needs in research, innovation, food production, and environmental protection, and they would support Bosnia and Herzegovina’s progress towards full European Union membership.

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